Research overview:

I study international security, with special interests in international institutions, great power politics, and nuclear security. My research has two clusters. The first rethinks international institutions in light of their geopolitical and illiberal uses. This cluster includes a book project, Stanton-funded research into nuclear security, and a collaborative research project on reactionary internationalism. The second cluster investigates everyday experiences of the international, specifically the role of subjective distance, and how this shapes how we think about catastrophic threats.

Rethinking institutions:

Book project.
Making and Breaking the World: Grand Bargains and Great Power Intervention argues that great power grand bargains help explain mixed military intervention patterns in periods of systemic stability. Grand bargains' geopolitical institutions, such as spheres of influence, helped great powers coordinate their military interventions and thus avoid great power war. The tragic consequence of these bargains was unchecked and sometimes genocidal local violence in great powers' respective hierarchies.

Nuclear control in context.
This two-year Stanton Foundation funded project examines the role of international institutions security architecture in the nuclear escalation control and deterrence regimes of the 20th century, with an eye to the security architecture of the future. Its preliminary argument is that conventional approaches to nuclear control treat nuclear issues in isolate; by looking at their broader institutional and geopolitical contexts, we can better understand their specific functions and limits.

Reactionary internationalism.
This project builds on work published in International Theory and International Studies Quarterly on the intersection between theories of history and international relations. We investigate how dispositions towards history are used to mobilize and justify world historical visions, with a focus on reactionary contestations of liberal world order.

With Joseph MacKay, Nicholas Michelsen, Pablo de Orellana, Erin K. Jenne, and Lucas Dolan.

Other research:

International relations and distance.
This project uses psychological distance, a concept developed in psychology and sociology, to critically investigate the microfoundations of international relations, with a focus on “distant” international problems such as nuclear war, superintelligent AI, and climate change. Psychological distance redefines "distance" as subjective and multidimensional--we experience entities as temporally, physically, socially, and hypothetically distant. This differs from the linear, measurable conception used in international relations research. Supported by an EISA exploratory symposium, the project aims to introduce international relations to a psychological distance approach and sketch its value in explaining humanitarianism, nuclear weapons, climate change, migration, and technology. With Simon Frankel Pratt, Alena Drieschova, Benjamin Tallis, and Markus Kornprobst.

Recent policy and public-facing publications:

Fear the Sphere: competing spheres of influence will not provide the stability their supporters expect
Foreign Policy, January 2026.
I argue an emerging international order based on spheres of influence will come with many risks, especially if competing spheres claims are not mutually recognized by great powers.

The U.S. President Should Practice for a Nuclear Crisis
Foreign Policy, November 2025.
I argue U.S. Presidents are unprepared for nuclear crises like that depicted in A House of Dynamite. Carefully designed executive nuclear education, though not without risks, can change that.

German Atomwaffen and the Superweapon Trap.
War on the Rocks, May 2024. With Gustav Meibauer.
We argue that German discussions of a nuclear Eurodeterrent underestimate proliferation's operational and political costs.

Russia's Nukes Are Probably Secure From Rogue Actors.
Foreign Policy, July 2023. With Kirill Shamiev.
We argue that Russia's nuclear command control means its nuclear arsenal is secure — but there's always a risk.

Ukraine Isn't Munich — or Vietnam or Berlin.
Foreign Policy, October 2022.
I argue that analogical reasoning, ubiquitous in foreign policy discussion and decision-making, often distorts more than it reveals.

Select peer-reviewed publications:

Last Things: narrative endings in international history and theory
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 31, No. 4 (December 2025): 914–938, with Joseph MacKay.
Endings give meaning. We read significance into stories—moral, political, analytical, biographical, historical—from how they conclude. Politics too is in this sense shaped or defined by eschatology: the possibility that the present story has a terminus and may be approaching it. Drawing on philosophy of history and literary theories of narrative structure, we argue International Relations (IR) theorists must take endings seriously as core aspects of how we construct theories to make sense of world politics. We develop a typological account of how endings shape historical theories in IR. We distinguish endings as either optimistic or pessimistic and as either determinate or indeterminate. This yields a two-by-two matrix, in which endings are classified as triumphalist, catastrophic, disenchanted, or renewalist. We unpack these with historical, theoretical, and literary examples. We then consider a countervailing approach, in which theorists attempt to refuse or reject endings. We consider two strategies of refusal: repetition and counter-narrative, again illustrating with examples. We conclude with a brief discussion of implications for historical research in IR.

Why is there no reactionary international theory?
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 62, No. 2 (June 2018): 234-244, with Joseph MacKay.

Why is there no reactionary international theory? International relations has long drawn on a range of traditions in political thought. However, no current, or even recent, major school of international-relations theory embraces reactionary doctrine. This is more surprising than some might assume. Reaction was once common in the field and is now increasingly common in world politics. In this note, we define reaction and show that no active and influential school of international-relations theory falls within its ideological domain. Nonetheless, reactionary ideas once deeply shaped the field. We identify two distinct kinds of reactionary international politics and illustrate them empirically. We argue that the current lack of reactionary international relations undermines the field's ability to make sense both of its own history and of reactionary practice. Finally, we offer some preliminary thoughts about why reactionary ideas hold little sway in contemporary international-relations theory.

Kenneth Waltz is not a neorealist (and why that matters).
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 2018): 153-176, with Simon Frankel Pratt.

Faced with scepticism about the status of grand theory in International Relations, scholars are re-evaluating Kenneth Waltz's contribution to theoretical debates in the field. Readers of Waltz have variously recast his work as structural functionalist, scientific realist and classical realist in liberal clothing. We contribute to this re-evaluation by systematically assembling misreadings of Waltz that continue to occur across all of International Relations' schools — that his theory is positivist, rationalist and materialist — and offering a coherent synthesis of his main contributions to International Relations theory. By linking Theory of International Politics to both Man, the State, and War and Waltz's post-1979 clarifications, we show that Waltz offers International Relations scholars a coherent vision of the worth and method of grand theory construction that is uniquely 'international.'' In particular, we focus on Waltz's methodology of theory building and use of images, demonstrating these to be under-appreciated but crucially important aspects of Waltz's work. We finish by proposing methodological, practical and pedagogical 'takeaways'; for International Relations scholars that emerge from our analysis.

The conduct of history in International Relations: rethinking philosophy of history in IR theory.
International Theory, Vol. 9, No. 2 (July 2017): 203-236, with Joseph MacKay.

IR scholars have made increasingly sophisticated use of historical analysis in the last two decades. To do so, they have appealed to theories or philosophies of history, tacitly or explicitly. However, the plurality of approaches to these theories has gone largely unsystematized. Nor have their implications been compared. Such historical–theoretic orientations concern the ‘problem of history’: the theoretical question of how to make the facts of the past coherently intelligible. We aim to make these assumptions explicit, and to contrast them systematically. In so doing, we show theories of history are necessary: IR-theoretic research unavoidably has tacit or overt historical–theoretic commitments. We locate the field’s current historical commitments in a typology, along two axes. Theories of history may be either familiar to the observer or unfamiliar. They may also be linear, having a long-term trajectory, nonlinear, lacking such directionality, or multilinear, proceeding along multiple trajectories. This comparative exercise both excavates the field’s sometimes-obscured commitments and shows some IR theorists unexpectedly share commitments, while others unexpectedly do not. We argue that better awareness of historical–theoretic reasoning, embedded in all IR uses and invocations of history, may encourage the discipline become more genuinely plural.